Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?
McGinn argues that consciousness arises from the brain through some natural property P, but that our concept-forming faculties may be constitutionally unable to grasp P — leaving the mind–body problem not false or mystical, but cognitively closed to us. The founding statement of “mysterianism.”
Mind–body problem Consciousness Cognitive closure Mysterianism
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Why it matters
Published in Mind in 1989, this paper gave analytic philosophy of mind one of its most debated positions: that the explanatory gap between brain and consciousness may reflect a limit of human cognition rather than a limit of science. McGinn calls the position transcendental naturalism — nature holds the answer, but our minds may be built in a way that permanently blocks access to it.
The argument reframed the debate around the hard problem of consciousness and remains a standard reference in discussions of cognitive closure, from Nagel and Chalmers to contemporary work on the limits of explanation.
How to cite
Related commentary: Cognitive Closure: Why the Mind-Body Problem Might Be Beyond Us